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We study how technological leadership affects persistence in product innovation. Relying upon a 
database of 1818 products marketed between 1990 and 1999 by 265 firms active in three markets of 
the Local Area Network (LAN) industry we first construct a measure of technological leadership 
and then relate this measure to persistence in innovation. We find that leaders are systematically 
more persistent innovators than laggards. We also find that leaders in one market can also 
systematically innovate in a related and adjacent market. Finally, we find a positive correlation 
between prior patenting activity and persistence in product innovation. 
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What determines persistence in innovative behaviour? Do technological leaders differ from 
laggards in terms of persistence? When are technological leaders in one market able to become 
persistent innovators in a related market? These issues have been on the agenda of researchers on 
economics, and innovation for quite some time. Early works have highlighted that prior innovative 
activity alone is a good predictor for the length of the innovative spell and that it tends to explain 
spell length better than other firms’ characteristics such as size (Geroski et al., 1997). ‘Bimodality’ 
exists in the pattern of persistence suggesting that persistence is stronger for firms that are either 
non innovators or great innovators (Cefis and Orsenigo, 2001). Finally, persistence in innovation is 
higher in sectors characterised by technological cumulativeness, R&D complementarities and 
learning-by-doing processes (Cefis, 2003). A common feature of these early studies is that they 
measure innovation persistence in terms of patenting activity. 
  
Alongside patents, new product introduction is another important indicator of innovation and 
several studies have analysed instances of product introduction. Khanna (1995) looks at new 
product introduction in mainframe computing. Greenstein and Wade (1998) and Stavins (1995) 
look at the probability of product entry and exit for computer mainframes and PCs respectively. 
De Figuereido and Kyle (2006) analyse the determinants of product turnover in the laser print 
market industry. Lerner (1997) and Thomas (1999) study new product introduction in the context 
of a ‘technological race’ in the Hard Disk Drive industry. Though these studies analyse the 
determinants of the incidence of new product introduction, they do not look explicitly at the issue 
of persistence in product innovation (i.e. whether innovators at period t more likely to innovate at the 
next time period). In addition, these papers do not look at the relationship between technological 
leadership and persistence in product innovation.  
 
There are several reasons why it is relevant to study the relationship between technological 




technological leadership may or may not reinforce market leadership depending on  the market 
structure and the presence of economic incentives to innovate. From a management strategy 
viewpoint, in markets characterised by rapid technical change and shortening of product life cycle, 
new products incorporate novel characteristics making existing products only an imperfect 
substitute for the new good. Within this context, persistence in product innovation may originate 
from incumbents’ strategies aimed at maintaining their transitory market power. These strategies 
may entail an expansion of the technological frontier, changes in product portfolio through 
product proliferation, and extension of product portfolios through innovation in related markets. 
Differences between technological leaders and laggards in terms of available resources, capabilities 
and complementary assets will translate into differences in persistence in product innovation.  
 
We examine the relationship between technological leadership and persistence in product 
innovation in the context of the Local Area Networking (LAN) industry. Our source of information 
is a comprehensive database of 1818 new products marketed between 1990 and 1999 in three LAN 
markets: hubs (536 products), routers (747 Products), and switches (535 products). For each 
product in our dataset we have information on: year of market introduction, technical 
characteristics, market price, and name of the manufacturer. Our dataset includes 265 firms which 
have been active in the industry. For each firm in the dataset we have collected information about 
date of entry into the industry, size in terms of employees, and sales when available. In addition to 
these data we also collected information on the patenting activity of the firms included in our 
sample. In particular, by looking at the (8 digits) International Patent Classification (IPC) class of 
the patents we have been able to link patents to innovative activity in a specific market. 
 
Using these data we carry out the following analyses. First, we employ data on product 
characteristics and price to calculate an indicator of technological leadership in each market. Here 
we proceed in two steps. For each market, hedonic price regressions are estimated and predicted 




and calculate the relative distance of each firm from the frontier. Second, we use this indicator to 
distinguish between technological leaders and laggards and produce Transition Probability 
Matrices (TPMs) to study persistence in product innovation for both types of firms. Third, we 
perform Conditional Risk Set Duration analysis to study the determinants of the probability to 
innovate in each period conditional on firms’ initial innovative status and technological leadership 
in the prior period. Our covariates include an indicator of technological leadership, as well a series 
of firm level controls such as firm size, age, market structure, and possession of intangible capital 
in terms of patent stock. Particular attention is devoted to estimating cross market effects (i.e. to 
study the impact of technological leadership in one market on persistence in another market) for 
multi product firms. 
 
Our main result is that technological leaders are relatively more persistent innovators than 
laggards. The closer a firm is to the technological frontier at t the higher the probability to 
commercialise a new product in the next time period, though the marginal effect of changes in 
distance from the frontier varies across markets reflecting different levels of technological 
opportunities. We also find that technological leaders in one market can also systematically 
innovate in a related and adjacent market. Additional results highlight a direct relationship between 
persistence in product innovation and (lagged) patenting and between the number of (lagged) 
patents and persistence in product innovation. 
 
Our findings provide the following contributions. First, they provide novel evidence on the 
determinants of innovation persistence. Prior empirical research on innovation persistence has 
mainly relied on patents as an indicator of innovative activity. We provide empirical evidence on 
persistence in product innovation. Second, we directly relate persistence to an indicator of 
technological leadership at the firm level. Prior empirical studies have instead focussed on other 
firm characteristics such as size, age, and/or R&D intensity. Third, we consider the case of firms 





Some of our findings are consistent the existing empirical literature on the role played by 
technological leaders in stretching the technological frontier in ‘technological races’. Other findings 
are consistent with prior research on persistence based on patents such as those confirming the 
presence of bimodality in persistence. Additional findings, that relate persistence in product 
innovation to the stock of patents, qualify the prior evidence highlighting that is the stock of 
intangible assets rather than lagged patenting what matters for innovation persistence. Finally, our 
findings for the case of related markets allow us to draw some indirect inference about persistence 
and firms’ strategies for changes and extension of their product portfolios. While both 
technological leaders and laggards could in principle extend their product portfolio to include 
related products, only technological leaders can effectively do it in the case of complex products. 
Laggards instead have to innovate at the lower end of the product spectrum.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we review the literature on persistence in 
innovation and propose our framework for analysis. Section 3 introduces some necessary 
background information on the LAN industry. Section 4 presents our data and method. Section 5 
introduces our empirical strategy. Results are presented in Section 6. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Conceptual framework 
One of the earliest discussions in the industrial organization and innovation literature has 
revolved around the relationship between innovation and market structure. While there is a 
general agreement that innovation is a source of monopolistic rents and therefore market power, 
less consensus exists on the relationship between market power and persistence in innovation. Two 
opposite views exist depending on the assumptions made on the incentives for incumbents to 





On the one hand, there is the view that incumbents with high market power have low incentive to 
continuously engage in innovation (Arrow, 1962) both because of the nature of the knowledge, 
which is assumed to be equally accessible to all firms, and because they are afraid of cannibalising 
their current source of revenues (Reinganum, 1983; 1985). Because of this ‘replacement effect’ their 
market power is temporary as their dominant position is quickly challenged and eroded by 
competitors. New innovators, which are typically small, and newly established firms, 
systematically substitute for incumbents.  
 
On the other hand, there is the view that considers persistence in innovation as crucial for 
maintaining market power. In this case incumbents have an incentive to continuously engage in 
innovation to maintain their dominant position (‘efficiency effect’) either because there are 
increasing returns to R&D or because they spend more in innovation (Scherer, 1965), or because 
the return to leaders of innovating and maintaining monopoly rents out-weight the replacement 
effect (Gilbert and Newbery, 1982).  
 
Prior empirical studies on innovation persistence have produced a series of ‘stylized facts’. First, 
production of innovations is subject to little dynamic economies of scale (the ‘success-breeds-
success’ paradigm) as the effect becomes apparent only after a ‘minimum innovation threshold’ is 
reached (Geroski et al., 1997). The threshold level of patents likely to induce a patenting spell of 3 
or more years is around 5 patents. A firm that produces 5 or more patents has roughly twice the 
probability of enjoying a patenting spell of any length greater than 3 years than a firm that 
produces only 4 patents.1 Second, there is bimodality in the pattern of innovation persistence (Cefis 
and Orsenigo, 2001). In particular, persistence is stronger for firms that are either non innovators 
or great innovators (i.e. having 6 or more patents in a year). This means that most firms innovate 
only occasionally or do not innovate at all. Yet innovative activities are to a significant extent 
generated by few firms that innovate persistently over time. Institutions and history do influence 




differ across countries. Third, persistence in innovation is related to the characteristics of the 
technology (Cefis, 2003) as it is higher in sectors characterised by technological cumulativeness, 
R&D complementarities and learning-by-doing processes. 
 
A common feature of these studies is that they measure persistence in terms of patenting activity.2 
In contrast with this focus on patents as an indicator of innovation we consider the case of product 
innovation. In differentiated, fast changing technology markets, such as the LAN industry studied 
in this paper, product innovation is a paramount source of market power for incumbents who 
compete by incorporating in products novel features which make existing products only an 
imperfect substitute for the new good (Bresnahan et al., 1997).3 This paper moves the focus beyond 
the perfect/ imperfect substitutability distinction. In our setting, incentives to persist in product 
innovation depend on the extent of technological leadership measured in terms of proximity to the 
technological frontier. We expect to observe differences in persistence between technological 
leaders and laggards for several reasons.  
 
First, technological leaders operate very close to the technological frontier. Though for them the 
marginal benefits from commercialising ‘yet another product’ may be decreasing, leaders are 
better placed to grasp new technological opportunities by extending the frontier, provided they 
have the resources and the convenience to do that.4 Greenstein and Wade (1998) look at the 
product life cycle in the commercial mainframe market. They find that ‘stretching’ the 
technological frontier leads to more frequent (i.e. persistence in) product introduction in a specific 
product class. In a study of new production introduction in high-end mainframe computing 
Khanna (1995) provides evidence that designers engage in ‘racing behaviours’ when they compete 
at the frontier. On the contrary technological laggards are not able to extend the frontier and they 
have fewer incentives to participate in the technological race. Product innovation in this case 
would largely consist in imitation of existing products (Lee et al., 2011) or be restricted to 




expect to find that the closer a firms is to the technological frontier, the more likely it is to persist in 
product innovation. 
 
Scholars of innovation strategy have also looked at persistence in product innovation. This 
literature has mainly explained persistence in terms of the characteristics of technology as well as 
in terms of firms' absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). If technology has a strong tacit 
component and is highly specific to individual firms (Penrose, 1959; Nelson and Winter, 1982) then 
innovation results from the accumulation of technological competencies by heterogeneous actors. 
Over time the firm specific, tacit and cumulative nature of the knowledge-base builds high barriers 
to entry. As a result, a few and large firms eventually continue to dominate the market in a stable 
oligopoly. 
 
According to this approach, instead of emerging from a ‘technological race’, persistence in product 
innovation may also be the consequence of product differentiation strategies linked to either 
growth in the product portfolio or to an extension of product portfolio. Growth in the product portfolio 
occurs when firms introduce many products in the same market. On the one hand there are 
product proliferation strategies when incumbents enter into unexplored areas of the same market 
mainly to cater for existing needs and/or to pre-empt competitive entry from potential 
competitors (Schmalensee, 1978). On the other hand, new products are rarely introduced alone in 
the market as firms choose instead to compete on the basis of product families (Draganska and 
Jain, 2005). Introducing product families allows incumbents to offer different variants of the same 
product in order to cater for different customer preferences. In her study of PC industry, Stavins 
(1995) relates pre-emption to incumbent’s experience as she shows that incumbents disperse more 
their products in the quality spectrum by exploiting advantages in terms of both reputation and 
economies of scope. Looking at product turnover in the desktop laser printer industry de 
Figuereido and Kyle (2006) find a positive correlation between the frequency of new product 




Incidence of entry is even higher for firms that are both innovative and have a strong brand. 
Sanderson and Usumeri (1995) show how leaders can rely upon their superior design capabilities 
and division of labour to change product characteristics and tailor them to specific needs. Thus, we 
expect that the closer a firm is to the technological frontier in a specific market, the more likely is to 
persist in product innovation in the same market. 
 
Extension of product portfolio occurs instead when firms decide to enter into related markets 
(Raubitschek, 1987; Bayus and Putsis, 1999).6 In this case, persistence may be beneficial for 
technological leaders that possess the resources to spread the risk of innovating over several 
markets (Bonanno, 1987; Bhatt, 1987). However, important limitations to portfolio expansion exist. 
Dowell (2006) finds that wide product portfolios can be detrimental to firms’ performance when 
they include products with very different designs. Similarly, Wezel and van Witteloostuijn (2006) 
show that benefits from product portfolio extension are inversely related to the technological 
distance between the existing and the new products inside the portfolio. These findings highlight 
that firms’ benefits from portfolio extension may depend on whether changes in new products 
entails incremental or improvements or radical departures from their existing designs. Within this 
context, radical departures from an existing design will be less likely pursued because of lack of 
organizational capabilities (Henderson, 1993), excessive myopia (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000), strong 
commitment to an existing customer base (Christensen, 1997) and/or high level of product 
complexity (Levinthal, 1997).7 While technological leaders possess the required capabilities to 
persist in product innovation in their own focal market, they can be expected to enjoy a relative 
advantage over competitors as long as innovating in the related market does not entail a radical 
departure from the product design in their focal market. We thus expect to find that, in the case of 
related markets, the closer a firm is to the technological frontier in a specific market, the more 






3. Background on the industry  
In this paper we study persistence in product innovation for a sample of manufacturers active in 
the LAN industry between 1990 and 1999. LANs are the infrastructure that enables data 
communication to occur within localised areas (i.e. a company and/or a university campus). LANs 
are systems made of technologically related components which play different functions within the 
network and embody technologies of different level of complexity.8 Hubs were relatively 
unsophisticated products whose function was mainly to link computers together. Routers were the 
most complex from the technological viewpoint as they were able to determine the best path for 
sending the data. Switches were more complex than hubs but (at least initially) less than routers. 
During the 1990s additional features (i.e. Layer 3 functionality, and Virtual LAN support), as well 
as a combination of hardware and software based changes (i.e. the adoption of ASICs based 
architecture and the implementation of new algorithms for forwarding data packets), enabled 
switches to directly compete with routers. Thus if we had to ‘rank’ LAN equipment available 
during the 1990s in terms of technological complexity we would have hubs at the bottom, switches 
somewhat in the middle, and routers at the top. 
 
Early LANs were adopted in organizations such as firms and universities during the 1970s. At that 
time they were closed systems based on proprietary communication standards (i.e. DECnet, SNA) 
and using computer mainframe and/or minicomputers. Their diffusion took off during the 1980s 
thanks to the definition of common transmission standards (i.e. Ethernet and Token Ring), the 
advent of Personal Computers, and innovation in hubs and routers (von Burg, 2001). They 
diffused widely during the 1990s thanks to new high speed standards (i.e. Fast Ethernet, FDDI, 
Gigabit Ethernet), the wide adoption of the internet protocol (i.e. TCP/IP) and the introduction of 
LAN switches (Fontana, 2008).  
 
While the overall structure of the LAN industry would eventually consolidate and evolve toward a 




market was polarised with few leader firms dominating the high-end of the market and 
responsible for innovations along the established trajectory and several firms at the ‘fringe’ 
producing only relatively unsophisticated products (i.e. ‘scaled down’ versions) for low-end 
customers. The router market was also highly concentrated with few firms dominating. Entry was 
virtually blockaded at the high-end (i.e. the so called multi-protocol router segment) and occurred 
mainly at the low-end (i.e. the access router segment). During the 1990s, the LAN switch market 
was in its infancy and characterised instead by lower entry barriers and an intense entrepreneurial 
activity with new solutions marketed by young start-ups as well as by established firms already 
active in the other two markets.  
 
There are at least two reasons why this industry between 1990 and 1999 represents an interesting 
case to study persistence in product innovation. First, there is the very fast rate of technical change 
and the shortening of the product life cycle. New equipment embodied new characteristics, both in 
the form of new communication standards, new hardware, and/or software. Persistence 
ultimately depended on the capability of incumbents to move forward the technological frontier 
and/or grow and extend their product portfolio. 
 
Second, manufacturers had a strong incentive to entry into related markets. Being part of a 
technical system, hubs, switches and routers might or not be produced by the same manufacturer. 
From the customer viewpoint, combining products from the same producer increased utility as 
benefits from interoperability and standardisation could be reaped. From the viewpoint of the 
manufacturers, expansion into related markets could enlarge the installed base and strengthen 
their market position (Chen and Forman, 2006). In this case, persistence was a consequence of the 







4. Data and method 
Our source of information is a comprehensive database of new products marketed between 1990 
and 1999 in the LAN industry. The dataset contains 1818 products commercialised in three 
markets: hubs (536 products), routers (747 Products), and switches (535 products). For each 
product in our dataset we have information on: year of market introduction, technical 
characteristics, market price, and name of the manufacturer. This dataset was constructed using 
information from specialized trade journals (Network World and Data Communications), which 
periodically published Buyers’ Guides and details on new product introductions. Our dataset 
includes 265 firms which have been active in the industry. These firms represent the population of 
the firms that introduced at least one new product in the LAN industry between 1990 and 1999. 
Most of the firms in the dataset were located in US and, though they operated globally, most of 
their sales were generated in the US in the period considered in this paper. For each firm in the 
dataset we have collected information about their entry date in the industry, size in terms of 
employees, and sales when available. This information was gathered from a variety of sources, 
such as COMPUSTAT, the D&B Million Dollar Database and firms’ annual reports. 174(65% of the 
total) firms in our sample were active in just one market. 67(25%) in two markets. 25(9%) in three 
markets. 15 firms were active in both hubs and routers. 24 were active in both routers and 
switches. 28 were active in both hubs and switches. 121 have introduced at least one hub, 136 at 
least one router, 126 at least one switch. In addition to these data we also collected information on 
the patenting activity of the firms included in our sample. This information was retrieved from the 
latest version of the NBER patent database (Hall et al., 2001). Table 1 reports overall summary 
statistics and broken down by market. 
 







5. Empirical strategy 
5.1. Empirical model  
Econometric studies of innovation persistence falls within two groups. One group of studies relies 
upon the estimation of hazard models for innovation spells (Geroski et al., 1997). Another group of 
studies (Peters, 2009; Clausen et al., 2010) has instead employed random effect probit models 
(Wooldridge, 2005) to estimate the effect of previous innovative efforts on the probability to 
further innovate at a specific point in time. In this paper we follow the former approach.  
 
In particular, we model product innovation by the firms in our sample as a repeated event and 
assume that after the first product introduction event is observed, the second and the following 
introductions are different from the first event. The implicit assumption that we are making is that, 
all the rest being equal, the more innovative events we observe for a firm the more likely is for that 
firm to experiment again the event in the future. Within this context, not taking event dependency 
into account would lead to incorrect estimates of the likelihood to innovate over time. Since we are 
considering a sample of firms that introduced at least one new product between 1990 and 1999, our 
sample is both right and left censored. It is right censored because we observe new products’ 
introduction only up to the end of 1999. It is left censored because firms enter the study at different 
points in time corresponding to the year in which we observe their second product innovation 
event.9  
 
Our analysis of time to product introduction event employs variance-corrected semi-parametric 
Cox’s Proportional Hazard (CPH) model. A variance corrected CPH model allows to control for 
the effects of repeated and interdependent events on the variance-covariance matrix in order to 
produce robust coefficients and standard errors. The approach we follow here is the conditional 
risk-set model proposed by Prentice et al. (1981).10 According to this model, at each time t we can 
define a risk set for observing a product innovation event k by considering all the firms that, at 




cannot be at risk of innovating for the fourth time without having already innovated three times 
before. This approach takes into account the order of the events and estimates are stratified by the 
rank of the event (i.e. the second product, the third product etc.). 
 
Let’s define with Tik the ‘true’ total time taken for firm ith to experience the kth product introduction 
event. Cik is the censoring time for the kth product introduction event and Xik is the observed 
duration (with Xik = min(Tik , Cik)). Finally, we define δik = I(Tik ≤  Cik), where I(.) indicates whether 
censoring occurs or not and we define inter-event times as: Gik =  Xik - Xi,k-1. Xi0 = 0 is the time when 
the firm enters the study (i.e. the time of first product introduction). 
 
The hazard function for the kth product introduction for firm ith at time t is given by: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )tZtthZth ikkkikik '10 exp; β−−=       (1), 
 
where Zik is the vector of explanatory variables for firm ith with respect to the kth product 
introduction. h0k(t) is the event specific baseline hazard for the kth product introduction. β’ is the 
vector of parameters to be estimated.  
 
Let tj be the jth ordered event time and R(ti) the set of firms at risk at time ti , the partial likelihood L 
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β        (3), 
 
where Yjk(t) = I(Gik > t). 
 
5.2. The model specification 
The equation introduced above is specified with several covariates. The first, and most important 
covariate, is a measure of technological leadership. Three types of indicators of leadership can be 
found in the literature. Indicators based on labour (Amable et al., 2007) or multifactor productivity 
(Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003; Bos et al., 2013); indicators based on financial assets such as Tobin’s q 
(Coad, 2011); indicators based on product characteristics and quality (Stavins, 1995). According to 
this approach product quality may be used to ‘rank’ firms in terms of distance to the technological 
frontier. Technological leaders can be distinguished from laggards and their behaviour in terms of 
persistence analysed. 
 
To construct our measure we follow Fontana and Nesta (2009) and proceed in two steps. First, for 
each market, hedonic price regressions are estimated and predicted prices are calculated. Second, 
predicted prices are used to compute a measure of technological frontier and calculate the relative 
distance of each firm from the frontier. In the first step, we estimate the following hedonic 




mitittjmtjmit zp εµαβα         (4), 
 
where pmit is the price of model m introduced by firm i at time t, ztjm is a vector of product 




is a time fixed effect, and µi is a firm fixed effect capturing the impact on the price of firms’ pricing 
practices unrelated to product characteristics such as reputation, market power and/or other 
unobserved characteristics.11 
  
In the second step we take the quality adjusted predicted price as an indicator of overall product 
quality and use it to rank products on ‘vertical’ product space: 
 
'' ˆmitmit pq =             (5), 
 
we then compute for each product a distance from the technological frontier: 
 
( ) 'max mittfmit qqd −=           (6). 
 
The higher is this distance the farther is the product from the frontier. Since firms may introduce in 
several products in each market in a given year, we calculate for each firm the minimum distance 
to technological frontier as follows: 
 
[ ]itfmitfit dd min=           (7). 
 
This indicator is our main measure of technological leadership (DISTANCE TO FRONTIER). 
Technological leaders (laggards) in a specific market would display relatively lower (higher) 
values for this indicator. As the indicator is normalised by dividing it by its standard deviation, the 






Beside distance to frontier, we consider other control variables that are likely to affect persistence 
in product innovation. All these variables capture firms’ characteristics and are, all but two, time-
varying. The variable SIZE is constructed on the basis of the number of full time employees. The 
existing literature has generally highlighted the presence of a positive relationship between firms’ 
size and persistence in innovation (Cohen and Levin, 1989; Kamien and Schwartz, 1982).12 
However, in some case a non linear trend has been found. To take this into account we include also 
the square of size (SIZE SQ). To capture market structure we use an index of market concentration 
(C4) defined as the sum of the market shares (in percentage) of the four largest companies (in terms 
of total turnover) in each market and for each year. Turnover is measured in million of US dollars.  
 
We control for the impact of knowledge and intangible assets on persistence in innovation by 
relying upon some indicators of firms’ patenting activity. PATENT STOCK/EMPLOYEES is the sum of 
the past patents granted to the firm in each year. It is an indicator of the stock of technological 
experience available to firms.13 Generally, past technological experience should impact positively 
on innovative activity through economies of scale in R&D (Cohen and Levin, 1989), learning by 
doing and/or by using (Rosenberg, 1982; Cohen and Klepper, 1996). However, we may expect this 
impact to vary also depending on the level of technological opportunity available to the firms. 
Firms maybe expected to make the most(least) out of technological experience when technological 
opportunities are the highest(lowest). As the accumulated measure of patents tends to be 
correlated to the size of the firm, we divide patent stock by the number of employees to make sure 
that our measure can be interpreted as an indicator of the pool of technology assets available to the 
firm.  
 
Alongside this variable we introduce two variables aimed at accounting for recent patenting 
activity. PATENT (T-1) is a dummy which is equal to one is the firm has filed for a patent in the 
previous year. This variable is supposed to capture the relationship between patenting activity and 




accounting for the number of patents filed by the firm in the previous year (NUMBER OF PATENTS 
(T-1)). Though a one to one relationship between a single patent and a product is impossible to 
establish, we expect persistence in product innovation to be positively associated to patenting.14 
Finally, we control for the ‘initial condition’ by including a variable measuring the number of new 
product at entry (NUMBER OF PRODUCT AT ENTRY).  
 
A correlation table for our covariates is reported in the Appendix (Table A4).  
 
[Insert Table A4 about here] 
 
It should be noted the presence of a positive correlation among our patent based indicators. The 
level of the coefficients is sometimes high but within an acceptable range.15  
 
6. Results 
6.1. Univariate analysis  
We provide preliminary evidence on technological leadership and persistence in product 
innovation by estimating two states TPMs for several sub-samples of our sample of innovative 
firms. Cefis (2003) defines persistence in terms of the probability for a firm to remain in the same 
state it was in period t at the subsequent period t+1. We are particularly interested in ‘persistent 
innovators’ (i.e. firms that persistently remain in the innovator state).  
 
Table 2 reports our preliminary results for each of the three markets.  
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
In the case of hubs, the probability of being a persistent product innovator is around 44%, it 




‘systematic’ innovators are more likely to be found in the case of more complex products. New 
entry in innovative behaviour is the highest in switches (around 37%) followed by routers (24%) 
and it is the lowest in hubs (22%). I the light of what we said in Section 3, this latter pattern clearly 
reflects changes in market opportunities in the LAN industry during the 1990s with the opening 
up of the switch market and the decline of hubs. In Table 3 we distinguish between technological 
leaders and laggards. 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
A first look at the results suggests that leaders are always more likely to be ‘systematic’ innovators 
than laggards. I this case, probabilities seem to reflect the level of product complexity with leaders 
displaying the highest persistence in innovation in the case of routers (63%), followed by switches 
(52%), and hubs (49%). It is interesting to note that laggards in complex products seem to be more 
persistent than laggards in less complex products. However, the difference between persistent 
leaders and laggards is slightly higher for complex products (10% in the case of routers vs. 9% in 
the case of switches and hubs). Laggards are also less likely than leaders to go from a non 
innovative to an innovative status. The difference is particularly large in the case of switches (44% 
vs. 33%) suggesting that there might have been new opportunities to innovate in this growing 
market, however only technological leaders seemed able to capture them. The following section 
presents our results for the multivariate analysis. 
 
6.2. Multivariate analysis 
Table 4 reports the results of the Cox conditional risk set estimates for persistence in innovation in 
the hub market. Explanatory variables are introduced in sequence.  
 





Model (1) considers the effect on persistence of distance to frontier only. The coefficient is negative 
and significant suggesting that firms located closer to the technological frontier at time t have a 
higher likelihood to introduce a new product in the following period. In other words, leaders are 
relatively more persistent innovators than laggards. The sign is robust to the inclusion of 
additional explanatory variables. One unit decrease in the distance to frontier increases the 
likelihood to innovate of about 19.7%.16 In model (2) we control for the impact of firm size, market 
concentration, and age on persistence. The inclusion of these variables decreases the number of 
observation to 126 due to missing information. Consistently with previous findings (Geroski et al., 
1997) our results suggest that large firms are more likely to innovate though the relationship seems 
to be non linear as indicated by the negative coefficient of SIZE SQ. Each additional employee 
increases the likelihood to innovate on average by 9.5%. The coefficient of C4 is positive and 
weakly significant. This evidence suggests that the degree of market concentration positively 
affects innovation persistence. The coefficient of AGE is not significant. In the final specification 
(model 3) we include our indicators of intangible capital based on patents. We first control for the 
presence of ‘state dependence’ by looking at whether product innovation at t is associated to the 
patenting decision (PATENT) and to the number of patents (NUMBER OF PATENTS) at t-1. In both 
cases the coefficients are positive and significant. Finally, we further control for the intensity of 
firm’s innovation cumulativeness by dividing the overall stock of patents by the number of 
employees (PATENT STOCK/EMPLOYEES). Altogether, these results indicate the presence of a ‘state 
dependence effect’ in which product innovation in one period is positively associated to both 
patenting and the number patents filed in the previous period. These effects notwithstanding, the 
relationship between possession of intangible capital and product innovation is not 
straightforward given that the coefficient for innovation propensity, as captured by the stock of 
patents per employees, is negative and significant.    
 





[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
The coefficient for distance to frontier is negative and significant suggesting that the farther firms 
locate from the technological frontier the lower is the likelihood of introducing a new product in 
the subsequent year. Again technological leadership seems positively associated to persistence in 
innovation and in this case the magnitude of the impact is greater than in the case of hubs. In 
particular a one unit decrease in the distance to frontier increases the likelihood to innovate of 
about 20% suggesting that in the switch market being leaders is crucial for continuing to innovate. 
Concerning our control variables, we do not find a significant effect of firm size and age but our 
control for market concentration (C4) has a positive and significant coefficient. All our patent 
indicators are instead significant. In particular, we find evidence of state dependence as suggested 
by the positive and significant coefficient for the lagged patent dummy. Also, the likelihood of 
introducing a product innovation increases with the number of patents filed at t-1. 
 
Results for the router market are summarised in Table 6.  
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
As in the previous cases, the coefficient estimate for distance to frontier is negative and significant 
indicating that technological leadership seems to positively affect persistence in product 
innovation. In this case the effect of leadership is smaller than in the case of hubs and switches as a 
one unit decrease in the distance to frontier increases the likelihood to innovate of 12.4%. The 
coefficient is quite stable across specification though the significance level changes as additional 
variables are added. The coefficient of AGE is now negative and significant indicating that in this 
market young firms are relatively more innovative than older ones. Also, our control for market 
concentration (C4) has a positive and significant coefficient. Finally, as in the previous cases, the 





We turn now to the analysis of leadership and innovation in related markets.  
 
6.3. Leadership and persistence in innovation in related markets  
As discussed in Section 3, hubs, switches, and routers are component of technological systems and 
may or may not be manufactured by the same firm. In this context it is interesting to understand 
whether technological leadership in a focal market could lead to persistence in a related market for 
those firms active in more than one market. We explore this possibility in Table 7 which reports a 
series of conditional risk set Cox models for firms active at least in two markets.17  
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
Model (1) considers the likelihood of introducing a new hub for those firms manufacturing both 
hubs and routers. The coefficient for distance to frontier is negative and significant confirming that 
technological leadership in the hub market increases the likelihood to innovate in hubs. The 
coefficient for distance to frontier in the router market, though negative, is not significant an 
indication that leadership in this related market is not associated to persistence in product 
innovation in hubs. Model (2) analyses the effect on the likelihood of persisting in innovation in 
hubs of leadership in the switch market. In this case leadership in switches is not associated to 
persistence in the hub market.  
 
Given that routers and switches are more complex products than hubs  
represent the two ‘extremes’ of complexity in the LAN product spectrum (i.e. they are not adjacent 
markets) this result is somewhat expected . 
 
In Model (3) we look at persistence in routers for routers and hubs producers. The coefficient 




concerning the relatively ‘un-relatedness’ of the two markets. Model (4) relates persistence in 
routers to technological leadership in the switch market. The negative and significant coefficient 
for distance to frontier in the switch market indicates that leadership in switches positively affects 
persistence in innovation in routers. A one unit decrease in the distance to frontier in the switch 
market increases the likelihood to innovate in routers of 27.9%. This evidence suggests that switch 
leaders could persistently innovate in the router market. 
 
Finally, we look at how leadership in related markets affects persistence in innovation in switches. 
Model (5) considers the case of leadership in hubs. The coefficient estimate for distance to frontier 
in hubs is negative and significant indicating that leadership in the hub market is positively 
associated to persistence in switches. Since hubs and switches are adjacent markets, we find again 
that the closer a firm is to the technological frontier in a specific market (hubs in this case), the 
more likely is to persist in product innovation in an adjacent market (switches). In this case, a one 
unit decrease in the distance to frontier in the hub market increases the likelihood to innovate in 
switches of 36.5%. Leadership in routers instead does not seem to affect persistence in switches 
(Model (6)). 
 
To summarise, our findings generally show a positive correlation between technological 
leadership in a specific market and persistence in innovation in a related market. However, this 
correlation is found only in the case of leaders entering in more adjacent and more complex 
markets (i.e. hub leaders in switches and switch leaders in routers). If we compare product 
innovation activity in the LAN industry to ‘climbing a ladder’ with more complex products (i.e. 
routers) on top and less complex (i.e. hubs) at the bottom, our findings indicate that technological 
leaders could move up to the next step of the ladder (i.e. innovate in more complex products) but 
not ‘leap’ straight to the top. In addition to this, leaders generally did ‘descend‘ the ladder (i.e. 
innovate in less complex products). Technological laggards instead could neither reach higher 




7. Sensitivity analysis 
Though interesting, it may be argued that our results suffer from important limitations. The first 
limitation concerns the presence of reverse causality. Our main argument is based on the idea that 
technological leadership leads to product innovation. However, in the industrial organization 
literature it is often argued that incumbents innovate in order to deter market entry or catching up 
by followers. If this is true, then technology leadership would follow persistence. To account for 
this possibility is particularly important in our setting given that our period of observation is, for 
all but one of the markets, two-sided censored. The second limitation is that the analysis may 
suffer from an omitted variable bias. Due to information availability constraints in our analysis we 
are not controlling for any R&D input measures. If one assumes that R&D spending and product 
innovation are positively related and that persistent innovators spend continuously more on R&D, 
then it may be argued that our results follows from the fact that R&D spending correlates both 
with persistence in innovation and technological leadership.  
 
In order to tackle these two limitations, in this section we generalize the CPHM introduced in 
Section 5 by adding an individual time-invariant frailty term (ωi) to the hazard function (1). The 
purpose of this generalization is to separate the persistence effect driven by true event dependence 
form the spurious one caused by time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity across individuals. We 
adopt the specification of the Conditional Frailty Cox (CFC) model proposed by Box-Steffensmeier 
and De Boef (2007)18 by generalizing the hazard and partial likelihood functions (1) and (3) as 
follows: 
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∏                               (9) 
 
Maximization of (9) is performed using the Expectation-Maximization (E-M) algorithm and 
assuming a gamma distribution for ωi and treating them as missing data. Controlling for 
unobserved heterogeneity allows us to partially solve the ‘initial condition’ problem for left 
censored observed spells (Ham and Lalonde, 1996) mentioned above. As we do not observe the 
initial state of the firm in each market, with the exception of the market for switches, our results 
may be biased by the presence of the ’initial condition‘ problem. As the CFC model assumes a 
functional form for the duration distribution of each initial state that is different not only from that 
of the other spells, but also from that of the other individuals, we can draw more robust 
conclusions in term of causality interpretation by allowing each firm’s initial state to be correlated 
with its time-invariant unobserved characteristics. Concerning the omitted variable bias, the CFC 
model can alleviate the problem as long as we assume that some important factors omitted from 
the hazard equation, such as R&D input measures, do not significantly change over time.19 
 
Results from the estimation of the CFC model are reported in Table 8 in which the main findings of 
the CPHM are confirmed. 
 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
In particular, the coefficient of the distance to the technological frontier is negative and significant 
in each of the three markets. The magnitude of this effect, which is comparable across markets as 
the distances to the frontier are standardized, is larger in the case of routers, with a coefficient 




of switches (and also in the case of routers, but to a lesser extent), the Frailty χ2 Test does not reject 
the null hypothesis of the absence of a significant unobserved heterogeneity factor (ωi) for this sub-
sample. As the switch market is the only one in our sample which we can observe since its 
inception, this result suggests that the CFC model is actually helpful in taking into account the 
initial condition problem that potentially affects the left-censored observations in both the hubs 
and the routers markets. 
 
8. Conclusion 
This paper has studied the relationship between technological leadership and persistence in 
product innovation for a sample of firms operating during the 1990s in three markets in the LAN 
industry a high-tech sector. During the period analysed here, the three markets under 
consideration (i.e. hubs, routers, and switches) differed in terms of product complexity, 
opportunity to innovate, barrier to entry and exit, and levels of concentration thus providing an 
interesting case to study persistence in product innovation. We first carried out a univariate 
analysis based on TPMs. Our analysis has revealed that persistence in product innovation is 
relatively higher for complex products (i.e. product with many technical characteristics and high 
interdependencies among them). In complex product markets technological leaders seem to 
innovate more systematically than in non-complex products. 
 
We then carried out a multivariate analysis by estimating conditional risk sets duration analysis. 
This analysis has revealed that, controlling for firm size and market structure, technological 
leadership seems to be always an important prerequisite for persistence in product innovation 
with technological leaders always more persistent innovators than laggards. Our results have 
highlighted the presence of a direct relationship between persistence in product innovation and 
(lagged) patenting. In addition to this, we also found that the number of (lagged) patents increases 
persistence in product innovation. Finally, we also found that technological leadership plays an 




can also systematically innovate in an adjacent more complex market. Our sensitivity analysis has 
revealed that our main results are robust to control for unobserved heterogeneity and reverse 
causation. 
  
These results have implications for our understanding of firms’ strategies for product innovation 
in high-tech industries. In particular, the finding that technological leaders are more persistent 
innovators than laggards suggests that these firms are responsible for extending the technological 
frontier which is not inconsistent with findings from other studies of technological races in hi-tech 
industries (Khanna, 1995; Lerner, 1997).  
 
Our results also allow us to speculate about the determinants of product portfolio changes and 
extensions. Our finding that technological leaders are more persistent is consistent with a situation 
in which they mainly change their product portfolio through product proliferation and the 
introduction of product families. Our finding for related markets suggests instead that we should 
expect to find differences between incumbents in terms of expansion of their product portfolio 
with technological leaders more able to ‘stretch’ their product portfolio farther than laggards as 
they can innovate in more complex but adjacent markets. 
 
Though interesting, our analysis is not without important limitations. First, we have considered 
the case of a specific industry characterised by high dynamism and high rate of innovation. Ideally 
one would like to compare our results with the case of other industries both high-tech but also 
low-tech in which technological leadership may be expected to play a less important role for 
innovation persistence. Second, our analysis is restricted to a ten years time span. Future research 
should try to extend the time series. Finally, our analysis has focussed on the relationship between 
technological leadership and innovation persistence. It has remained silent about the issue of 
persistence in technological leadership. Whether persistence in leadership can be considered a pre-
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Table 1: Summary descriptive statistics  
 Obs. Mean SD Min Max 
Hubs      
DIST FRONT HUBS 204 0 1 -1.570 1.985 
SIZE (EMPLOYEES/100) 126 3.157 6.660 0.003 31.270 
C4 (PERCENTAGE) 204 94.624 2.991 89.549 99.186 
AGE (LOG - YEARS) 204 2.430 0.822 0 4.477 
NUMBER OF PRODUCTS AT ENTRY 204 2.015 1.533 1 8 
NUMBER OF PATENTS AT T-1/1000 204 0.080 0.302 0 2.405 
PATENT AT T-1 (DUMMY) 204 0.456 0.499 0 1 
PATENT STOCK/EMPLOYEES 126 0.176 0.352 0 3.571 
Routers      
DIST FRONT ROUTERS 246 0 1 -1.993 2.381 
SIZE (EMPLOYEES/100) 246 3.756 7.407 0.001 31.700 
C4 (PERCENTAGE) 246 92.195 7.970 75.369 99.900 
AGE (LOG - YEARS) 159 2.375 0.890 0 4.477 
NUMBER OF PRODUCTS AT ENTRY 246 2.028 1.329 1 7 
NUMBER OF PATENTS AT T-1/1000 246 0.062 0.301 0 2.405 
PATENT AT T-1 (DUMMY) 246 0.321 0.468 0 1 
PATENT STOCK/EMPLOYEES 136 0.113 0.173 0 0.781 
Switches      
DIST FRONT SWITCHES 149 0 1 -2.103 1.810 
SIZE (EMPLOYEES/100) 98 2.301 5.081 0.001 30.740 
C4 (PERCENTAGE) 145 89.982 6.633 79.410 96.532 
AGE (LOG - YEARS) 149 2.299 0.916 0 4.477 
NUMBER OF PRODUCTS AT ENTRY 149 1.745 1.420 1 8 
NUMBER OF PATENTS AT T-1/1000 149 0.057 0.233 0 2.405 
PATENT AT T-1 (DUMMY) 149 0.544 0.500 0 1 
PATENT STOCK/EMPLOYEES 98 0.214 0.433 0 3.571 
All markets      
SIZE (EMPLOYEES/100) 360 3.150 6.587 0.001 31.700 
C4 (PERCENTAGE) 595 92.488 6.562 75.369 99.900 
AGE (LOG - YEARS) 599 2.375 0.874 0 4.477 
NUMBER OF PRODUCTS AT ENTRY 599 1.953 1.426 1 8 
NUMBER OF PATENTS AT T-1/1000 599 0.067 0.286 0 2.405 
PATENT AT T-1 (DUMMY) 599 0.422 0.494 0 1 




Table 2: Transition probabilities between innovative states  
 HUBS SWITCHES ROUTERS 
 Innovative at t+1 Innovative at t+1 Innovative at t+1 
 Non Innovator Innovator Non Innovator Innovator Non Innovator Innovator 
Non innovator 77.92% 22.08% 63.29% 36.71% 76.12% 23.88% 
Innovator 56.20% 43.80% 52.94% 47.06% 42.52% 57.48% 
 
Table 3: Transition probabilities between innovative states: Leaders vs. Laggards 
 HUBS SWITCHES ROUTERS 
Leaders Innovative at t+1 Innovative at t+1 Innovative at t+1 
 Non Innovator Innovator Non Innovator Innovator Non Innovator Innovator 
Non innovator 76.45% 23.55% 56.10% 43.90% 76.29% 23.71% 
Innovator 51.30% 48.70% 47.50% 52.50% 36.64% 63.36% 
Laggards       
Non innovator 78.90% 21.10% 67.26% 32.74% 76.00% 24.00% 
Innovator 60.14% 39.86% 56.45% 43.55% 47.24% 52.76% 
Note: Technological leaders are firms whose distance to technological frontier at entry is lower or equal to the average in that year. Technological laggards are firms whose 




Table 4: Conditional risk set Cox models for persistence in innovation (Hub Market) 
 [1] [2] [3] 
DIST FRONT HUBS T-1 (STANDARD.) -0.222 -0.241 -0.197 
 [0.077]*** [0.079]*** [0.075]*** 
SIZE (EMPLOYEES/100)  0.148 0.082 
  [0.056]*** [0.070] 
SIZE SQ (EMPLOYEES/100 SQUARED)  -0.005 -0.004 
  [0.002]*** [0.002]* 
C4 (PERCENTAGE)  0.060 0.041 
  [0.034]* [0.032] 
AGE (LOG - YEARS)  -0.115 -0.205 
  [0.126] [0.146] 
NUMBER OF PRODUCTS AT ENTRY   -0.029 
   [0.067] 
NUMBER OF PATENTS AT T-1/1000   1.226 
   [0.266]*** 
PATENT AT T-1 (DUMMY)   0.558 
   [0.212]*** 
PATENT STOCK/EMPLOYEES   -1.792 
   [0.780]** 
Observations 204 126 126 
No of failures 152 102 102 
Time at risk 371 215 215 
Log pseudo-likelihood -463.163 -246.788 -241.704 
Wald chisq.  8.34*** 19.89*** 45.82*** 
Robust standard errors in brackets. Efron method for ties. Standard errors adjusted for clustering on firms. 




Table 5: Conditional risk set Cox models for persistence in innovation (Switch Market) 
 [1] [2] [3] 
DIST FRONT SWITCHES T-1 (STANDARD.) -0.222 -0.220 -0.199 
 [0.082]*** [0.102]** [0.092]** 
SIZE (EMPLOYEES/100)  0.0126 -0.043 
  [0.042] [0.046] 
SIZE SQ (EMPLOYEES/100 SQUARED)  -0.001 0.001 
  [0.001] [0.001] 
C4 (PERCENTAGE)  0.105 0.089 
  [0.019]*** [0.020]*** 
AGE (LOG - YEARS)  0.0047 0.040 
  [0.160] [0.132] 
NUMBER OF PRODUCTS AT ENTRY   0.054 
   [0.027]** 
NUMBER OF PATENTS AT T-1/1000   0.462 
   [0.266]* 
PATENT AT T-1 (DUMMY)   0.651 
   [0.281]** 
PATENT STOCK/EMPLOYEES   -0.341 
   [0.182]* 
Observations 149 95 95 
No of failures 111 76 76 
Time at risk 199 123 123 
Log pseudo-likelihood -326.393 -177.824 -174.370 
Wald chisq.  7.35*** 60.82* 166.56*** 
Robust standard errors in brackets. Efron method for ties. Standard errors adjusted for clustering on firms. 





Table 6: Conditional risk set Cox models for persistence in innovation (Router Market) 
 [1] [2] [3] 
DIST FRONT ROUTERS T-1 (STANDARD.) -0.255 -0.128 -0.124 
 [0.071]*** [0.064]** [0.074]* 
SIZE (EMPLOYEES/100)  0.081 0.082 
  [0.023]*** [0.027]*** 
SIZE SQ (EMPLOYEES/100 SQUARED)  -0.003 -0.004 
  [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
C4 (PERCENTAGE)  0.081 0.074 
  [0.018]*** [0.018]*** 
AGE (LOG - YEARS)  -0.054 -0.192 
  [0.086] [0.097]** 
NUMBER OF PRODUCTS AT ENTRY   0.015 
   [0.084] 
NUMBER OF PATENTS AT T-1/1000   0.454 
   [0.149]*** 
PATENT AT T-1 (DUMMY)   0.253 
   [0.196] 
PATENT STOCK/EMPLOYEES   -0.073 
   [0.359] 
Observations 246 136 136 
No of failures 191 116 116 
Time at risk 386 196 196 
Log pseudo-likelihood -601.639 -266.866 -265.296 
Wald chisq.  12.84*** 72.94*** 182.04*** 
Robust standard errors in brackets. Efron method for ties. Standard errors adjusted for clustering on firms. 




Table 7: Conditional risk set Cox models for persistence in innovation – Related market analysis 
 HUBS ROUTERS SWITCHES 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
DIST FRONT HUBS T-1 (STANDARD.) -0.277 -0.131 0.008  -0.283  
 [0.134]** [0.133] [0.122]  [0.157]*  
DIST FRONT ROUTERS T-1 (STANDARD.) -0.280  -0.338 0.0128  -0.071 
 [0.228]  [0.217] [0.128]  [0.180] 
DIST FRONT SWITCHES T-1 (STANDARD.)  0.072  -0.375 -0.156 -0.321 
  [0.151]  [0.184]** [0.153] [0.148]** 
SIZE (EMPLOYEES/100) 0.140 -0.015 -0.030 0.0540 -0.0136 -0.205 
 [0.073]* [0.101] [0.056] [0.103] [0.062] [0.111]* 
SIZE SQ (EMPLOYEES/100 SQUARED) -0.001 -0.002 -0.0002 -0.0013 -0.0001 0.0005 
 [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.0002] [0.001]* [0.0002] [0.0003]* 
C4 (PERCENTAGE) -0.006 0.215 0.047 0.039 0.127 0.128 
 [0.069] [0.075]*** [0.025]* [0.031] [0.043]*** [0.055]** 
AGE (LOG - YEARS) 0.773 -0.580 0.101 -0.329 0.019 -0.256 
 [0.547] [0.378] [0.191] [0.295] [0.188] [0.125]** 
NUMBER OF PRODUCTS AT ENTRY 0.732 -0.074 -0.157 -0.102 0.025 -0.025 
 [0.446] [0.097] [0.123] [0.089] [0.023] [0.045] 
NUMBER OF PATENTS AT T-1/1000 1.850 5.552 0.936 2.596 0.452 0.277 
 [0.669]*** [1.130]*** [0.415]** [1.634] [0.339] [0.332] 
PATENT AT T-1 (DUMMY) -0.0536 0.967 1.005 0.257 0.529 -0.035 
 [0.737] [0.548]* [0.459]** [0.616] [0.379] [0.571] 
PATENT STOCK/EMPLOYEES -4.723 -1.265 0.099 1.041 0.289 3.141 
 [2.531]* [1.370] [2.661] [2.147] [0.371] [1.612]* 
Observations 38 49 37 34 48 33 
No of failures 29 34 30 29 36 28 
Time at risk 61 76 58 48 61 40 
Log pseudo-likelihood -31.733 -36.274 -30.138 -22.545 -54.877 -32.636 
Wald chisq.  168.08*** 280.05*** 26.73*** 43.36*** 104.12*** 72.73*** 
Robust standard errors in brackets. Efron method for ties. Standard errors adjusted for clustering on firms. 




Table 8: Conditional Frailty Cox models for persistence in innovation  
 HUBS ROUTERS SWITCHES 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
DIST FRONT HUBS T-1 (STANDARD.) -0.234 -0.225     
 [0.132]* [0.122]*     
DIST FRONT ROUTERS T-1 (STANDARD.)   -0.438 -0.438   
   [0.122]*** [0.127]***   
DIST FRONT SWITCHES T-1 (STANDARD.)     -0.246 -0.283 
     [0.135]** [0.141]** 
SIZE (EMPLOYEES/100) 0.288 0.217 0.066 0.069 0.020 -0.051 
 [0.076]*** [0.080]*** [0.045] [0.047] [0.066] [0.076] 
SIZE SQ (EMPLOYEES/100 SQUARED) -0.010 -0.009 -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 0.001 
 [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.002]* [0.002]* [0.003]* [0.003] 
C4 (PERCENTAGE) 0.049 0.032 0.149 0.148 0.151 0.138 
 [0.046] [0.046] [0.032]*** [0.032]*** [0.031]*** [0.033]*** 
AGE (LOG - YEARS) -0.179 -0.151 0.002 -0.017 0.060 0.182 
 [0.188] [0.196] [0.144] [0.174] [0.186] [0.205] 
NUMBER OF PRODUCTS AT ENTRY  -0.052  -0.054  -0.090 
  [0.091]  [0.094]  [0.077] 
NUMBER OF PATENTS AT T-1/1000  0.518  0.295  0.287 
  [0.537]  [0.511]  [0.497] 
PATENT AT T-1 (DUMMY)  0.710  -0.059  0.754 
  [0.286]***  [0.252]  [0.322]** 
PATENT STOCK/EMPLOYEES  -1.690  0.203  -0.216 
  [1.074]  [0.844]  [0.353] 
Observations 126 126 136 136 95 95 
χ2 Frailty Test (all ωi=0) 42.67*** 37.44** 4.58 0.63 0.01 0.01 
Log pseudo-likelihood -202.1 -197.4 -179.5 -179.1 -144.8 -141.6 
LR Test 72.6*** 76.3*** 66.7*** 60.1*** 35.8*** 42.1*** 
Robust standard errors in brackets. Efron method for ties. Standard errors adjusted for clustering on firms. 






Table A1: OLS regressions on observed hub prices 
  
BACKPLANE CAPACITY (LOG) 0.229 
 [0.055]*** 
MAXIMUM NO OF PORTS (LOG) 0.551 
 [0.066]*** 
TOKEN RING (DUMMY) 0.336 
 [0.141]** 
OTHER STANDARDS (DUMMY) 0.669 
 [0.179]*** 






Dependent variable: logarithm of deflated list product price. Robust standard errors in brackets 




Table A2: OLS regressions on observed router prices 
  
MAXIMUM NO OF LANS (LOG) 0.503 
 [0.069]*** 
MAXIMUM NO OF WANS (LOG) 0.376 
 [0.058]*** 
FRAME RELAY SUPPORT (DUMMY) 0.166 
 [0.081]** 
ISDN & ATM SUPPORT (DUMMY) 0.045 
 [0.132] 
SONET SUPPORT (DUMMY) 0.425 
 [0.213]** 
OSPF ALGORITHM SUPPORT (DUMMY) 0.071 
 [0.107] 
RIP1-2 ALGORITHM SUPPORT (DUMMY) -0.222 
 [0.150] 
APPLETALK PROTOCOL SUPPORT (DUMMY) -0.053 
 [0.104] 
DECNET PROTOCOL SUPPORT (DUMMY) 0.186 
 [0.129] 
IPX PROTOCOL SUPPORT (DUMMY) -0.059 
 [0.111] 
SNA PROTOCOL SUPPORT (DUMMY) 0.141 
 [0.073]** 
TCP/IP PROTOCOL SUPPORT (DUMMY) 0.244 
 [0.167] 






Dependent variable: logarithm of deflated list product price. Robust standard errors in brackets 




Table A3: OLS regressions on observed switch prices 
  
BACKPLANE CAPACITY (LOG) 0.191 
 [0.038]*** 
NO OF ETHERNET PORTS (LOG) 0.068 
 [0.030]** 
NO OF FAST ETHERNET PORTS (LOG) 0.014 
 [0.040] 
NO OF FDDI PORTS (LOG) 0.031 
 [0.069] 
NO OF TOKEN RING PORTS (LOG) 0.116 
 [0.043]*** 
NO OF 100VG ANY-LAN PORTS (LOG) 0.185 
 [0.131] 
NO OF ATM PORTS (LOG) 0.043 
 [0.061] 
NO OF GIGABIT ETHERNET PORTS (LOG) 0.370 
 [0.066]*** 
VLAN CAPABILITY (DUMMY) 0.145 
 [0.115] 
CHASSIS (DUMMY) 0.815 
 [0.160]*** 






Dependent variable: logarithm of deflated list product price. Robust standard errors in brackets 




Table A4: Correlation matrices  
Hubs N=126 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. DIST FRONT HUBS 1       
2. NUMBER OF PRODUCTS AT ENTRY -0.3676 1      
3. SIZE (EMPLOYEES/100) 0.067 -0.2558 1     
4. C4 (PERCENTAGE) 0.0747 -0.0158 0.0677 1    
5. AGE (LOG - YEARS) 0.165 -0.2549 0.3966 0.0135 1   
6. NUMBER OF PATENTS AT T-1/1000 0.0641 -0.2057 0.6979 0.116 0.5398 1  
7. PATENT AT T-1 (DUMMY) 0.0149 -0.0988 0.3504 0.0982 0.2843 0.2702 1 
8. PATENT STOCK/EMPLOYEES 0.1385 -0.1848 0.1519 -0.08 0.3283 0.2196 0.1031 
Routers N=136        
1. DIST FRONT ROUTERS 1       
2. NUMBER OF PRODUCTS AT ENTRY 0.0884 1      
3. SIZE (EMPLOYEES/100) -0.0082 -0.1078 1     
4. C4 (PERCENTAGE) -0.083 0.0652 0.005 1    
5. AGE (LOG - YEARS) 0.0284 0.1587 0.4035 -0.1211 1   
6. NUMBER OF PATENTS AT T-1/1000 0.0571 0.0591 0.6598 0.1088 0.4958 1  
7. PATENT AT T-1 (DUMMY) -0.1521 0.1306 0.1846 0.0387 0.3973 0.2888 1 
8. PATENT STOCK/EMPLOYEES 0.143 0.1126 0.3085 -0.0673 0.3137 0.4878 0.4029 
Switches N=95        
1. DIST FRONT SWITCHES 1       
2. NUMBER OF PRODUCTS AT ENTRY -0.2111 1      
3. SIZE (EMPLOYEES/100) -0.083 -0.0362 1     
4  C4 (PERCENTAGE) 0.0332 -0.0662 -0.0981 1    
5. AGE (LOG - YEARS) -0.0701 -0.0063 0.6446 -0.1122 1   
6. NUMBER OF PATENTS AT T-1/1000 -0.0247 -0.0019 0.6707 0.1189 0.4785 1  
7. PATENT AT T-1 (DUMMY) -0.1844 0.1347 0.252 0.2661 0.1614 0.2195 1 
8. PATENT STOCK/EMPLOYEES -0.0021 -0.0324 0.1048 -0.1526 0.2338 0.1351 0.0716 
All markets N=357        
2. NUMBER OF PRODUCTS AT ENTRY - 1      
3. SIZE (EMPLOYEES/100) - -0.1331 1     
4. C4 (PERCENTAGE) - 0.0015 0.0044 1    
5. AGE (LOG - YEARS) - -0.0377 0.4459 -0.0778 1   
6. NUMBER OF PATENTS AT T-1/1000 - -0.0529 0.6746 0.1132 0.5074 1  
7. PATENT AT T-1 (DUMMY) - 0.0448 0.2408 0.1033 0.2944 0.2618 1 






                                                
1 Concerning the interpretation of the threshold effect, Geroski et al. (1997) argue that while dynamic economies may 
lead to longer and more persistent spells of innovation by firms, they do so only when the threshold of initial or pre-spell 
innovative activity is high enough to temporarily overcome strong ‘within spell forces’ which may delay the production 
of innovation. In Malerba et al. (1997) the threshold has been found to constrain the innovative activity especially of small 
and medium firms 
2 Further empirical investigations based on country level innovation surveys are: Roper and Hewitt-Dundas (2008) who 
study persistence in both product and process innovation for a sample of innovators in Ireland; Clausen et al. (2012) who 
find that differences in persistence between product and process innovations are mediated by firms’ innovation 
strategies for a sample of Norwegian high-tech and low-tech firms; Raymond et al. (2010) who find that firms in the high-
tech sector are more persistent innovators than firms in the low-tech one. Further evidence on persistence is found by 
both Peters (2009) and Manez et al. (2009). The former paper studies persistence both in manufacturing and services for a 
sample of German firms. The latter provides evidence on the case of Spanish manufacturing firms. Both these papers 
measure persistence in terms of total innovation expenditure an indicator of input in the innovation process. 
3 Alternatively incumbents may rely upon other traditional means, such as patents, to continue to benefit from their 
market power. In the LAN industry, particularly during the period under examination here, competition mainly 
revolved around the definition and commercialization of open transmission and communication standards. Therefore, 
patents played a minor role as appropriation tools. 
4 The marginal benefits also set the conditions for a leader ‘to persist being a leader’. These conditions depend on the 
opportunity costs of switching to a new technology. When opportunity costs are negligible, as in Schivardi and 
Schneider (2008), technological leaders are always able to maintain their leadership. When the opportunity costs are 
assumed to be inversely related to the relative advantage of the leader, as in Metcalf (2011), the leader firm becomes less 
able to keep its leadership the higher its initial advantage with respect to competitors. In our paper we do not examine 
the issue of persistence in technological leadership. Rather we focus on the relationship between technological leadership 
and innovation persistence.  
5 Lerner (1997) studies the technology race in the Hard Disk Drive industry. He finds that laggards whose technological 
performance lies between 25% and 74% of that of the leader are most likely to innovate. No effect is found for the firms 
located in the bottom 25%. 
6 Alternatively, the extension of a firm’s product portfolio to adjacent markets may be the consequence of ‘brand 
extension’ when consumers are uncertain about product characteristics and brands may play an informational role 
(Choi, 1998), or follow from a strategy of entry deterrence (Choi and Scarpa, 1992).  




                                                                                                                                                            
8 According to Levinthal (1997) product complexity can be assessed along two dimensions: number of product 
characteristics and extent of interdependences among the characteristics. The higher the number of technical 
characteristics the higher the extent of complexity. The stronger the level of interdependences the more difficult is to 
change a characteristic without repercussions on the others and therefore on the overall design of a product. 
9 Since technological leadership is measured in terms of firm’s location with respect to the technological frontier, we need 
to use information on the first product introduction to calculate this indicator. Another source of left censoring is the fact 
that routers and hubs already existed prior to 1990. 
10 For the exposition of the model we draw upon Squicciarini (2009). 
11 An alternative would be to measure the technological frontier by relying upon an overall performance measure (such 
as data processing speed) and/or upon a single ‘representative’ technical characteristic. With respect to these options, 
our approach has at least two advantages. First and foremost it is more comprehensive as it allows the inclusion of 
several technological characteristics which may impact on the quality adjusted price of the new product. Second, it 
allows us to include both firm and time fixed effect in the regression. Controlling for firm fixed effect is particularly 
important to capture unobservable effects (i.e. brand effects), firms’ specific practices (i.e. company related quantity 
discounts), and/or firms’ specific innovation strategies (i.e. companies using high quality components through licenses) 
which may impact on prices. Results for the hedonic price regressions for each market are reported in the Appendix.  
12 For private firms this information was not always available with consequent loss of observations in the econometric 
exercise.  
13 PATENT STOCK accounts for the number of citations received by the patents. It is depreciated at the 15% rate.  
14 A qualification is in order here. Our patent based indicators do not simply consider the total number of patents 
granted to each firm. Instead we consider only the patents that are related to the specific LAN product (i.e. hubs, routers, 
switches). Identification of these patents is done on the basis of the main International Patent Classification (IPC) class (at 
8 digits) of the patent. 
15 We assessed the degree of multicollinearity in our survival models by estimating the same models with Ordinary Least 
Squares techniques, using the logarithm of the time spells as dependent variable, and by computing the Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF). For every model, a value of VIF higher than the standard tolerance level of 5 was detected only for 
the estimates associated with SIZE and SIZE SQ. In all the estimated models the average VIF was never higher than the 
maximum tolerance level of 10. 
16 In this and in the following regressions, all marginal effects are calculated with reference to the final model 
specification (Model 3).  
17 This focus implies a non trivial reduction of the sample size available for our analyses and may raise some concerns 




                                                                                                                                                            
(which causes the parameter estimates of a Cox model to diverge, with infinite standard errors, while the likelihood 
converges to a finite value) primarily occurs in small samples, with substantial censoring and several highly predictive 
covariates. This problem has been analyzed more in deep by Heinze and Schemper (2001), who studied the behaviour of 
the bias-reducing penalized likelihood estimator proposed by Firth (1993) using Monte-Carlo simulations and showing 
that monotone likelihood rarely occurs with continuous covariates and few censored observations. On the basis of these 
findings we are quite confident on the accuracy of our estimates none of ore estimated coefficients or standard errors 
tend to diverge, almost all of our covariates, except PATENTS (T-1), are continuous and less than 10% of our 
observations are censored. 
18 In this paper the authors show, by using simulated and real data taken from clinical trials, that most of the commonly 
used model for repeated events, such as the Conditional-Cox and the Frailty-Cox models, lead to biased estimates when 
both true event dependence and unobserved heterogeneity are simultaneously present, whereas with the CFC model the 
bias disappears at cost of a minimal loss of efficiency. 
19 This assumption seems reasonable in the presence of high adjustment and sunk costs (see for instance: Himmelberg 
and Petersen, 1994). 
